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Colombia’s fifty-year-old civil war, the longest in Latin America history, critically 
impacted the lives of its citizens. This civil war had its roots in the assassination of a beloved 
populist leader, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948, when citizens took to the streets in mass protests 
and riots. Following the bogotazo, country entered a period known as the violencia, then in the 
1970s the peasant led guerrilla movements emerged as a result of the lack of land reform. In the 
1980s, the illicit cocaine trade emerged as a social phenomenon when drug cartels began to 
organize and establish control over certain areas and trade routes. Alongside these cartels and 
often acting as one, right-wing paramilitaries also formed as an extension of the monetary class – 
landed elites and the commercial sector—and the government in order to protect individuals’ 
own financial interests. The constant war between these different armed groups increased in the 
late 1990s, so much so that by the end of Andres Pastrana’s Presidency, 1998-2002, public 
opinion shifted against negotiating with armed rebels. Instead, many citizens wanted the 
government to reassert its control over violence and generate the economic growth and stability 
that had been lacking since the economic crisis of the late 1990s. In so being “in the next 
election, enfranchised Colombians voted overwhelmingly for Alvaro Uribe Velez, who promised 
to wage all-out war on the FARC to improve national security.”1 During the first four years of 
his presidency, Uribe was able to maintain popularity. In 2005 after the Colombian Supreme 
Court made a constitutional amendment that allowed for presidents to run for a consecutive four-
year term in office, Uribe announced he would run for another term. In 2006, Uribe was once 
again the most popular candidate and won the presidential election.  
                                                
1 Gray, V. J. (2008). The New Research on Civil Wars: Does It Help Us Understand the 
Colombian Conflict? Latin American Politics and Society, 50(3), p.65  
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Over the next eight years Uribe’s government would be plagued by very high profile 
scandals, which include the parapolitics scandal, the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad 
(Administrative Security Department, DAS) scandal, and the false-positives scandal. These 
scandals led to a number of arrests of important officials in his administration. In order to 
understand the centrality of the scandals to Uribe’s presidency, it must be understood that he 
campaigned on the promise of public security for Colombian citizens. However, these scandals 
serve to illustrate that the methods Uribe’s government used to increase public security were 
grounded in human rights violations. His government colluded with paramilitaries to terrorize 
and execute extra-judicial killings against trade unionists and opponents of his government; it 
illegally wiretapped political opponents; and its policies led to the military systematically killing 
civilians. Nonetheless, Uribe’s approval ratings remained extremely high in comparison to other 
countries in Latin America, his administration received a 69.3 percent evaluation of performance 
rating in 2008.  
This thesis seeks to investigate how Alvaro Uribe Velez gained and maintained such high 
levels of popularity, even in comparison with other Latin American country’s leaders, despite his 
administration being riddled with serious scandals. Economic policy such as measures of 
economic development, decreased organized violence, and strong citizen support, in spite of the 
increase in petty crime and displacement rates, may be interpreted as indicators of Colombia 
having benefitted from the stability. However, I argue that these scandals, instead of simply 
posing as a potential challenge to Uribe’s popularity, expose a mechanism of control that served 
to enhance that popularity. This is because the parapolitics scandal, the Departamento 
Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative Security Department, DAS) scandal, and the false-
positive scandal are not just aberrations that occurred during his presidency. Instead, they 
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function as mechanisms that support and enhance his success in delivering stability to 
Colombia’s middle and upper-classes, while further marginalizing the lower class.  
The parapolitics scandal refers to evidence demonstrating that in Colombia there are 
formal connections between the paramilitaries and members of the political system. The 
parapolitics scandal is indicative of state officials having ties to criminal organizations, 
fraudulent elections, and a paramilitary supported and endorsed government. The relationship 
between these two entities demonstrates that they function as mechanisms that support and 
enhance Uribe’s successes.   
The paramilitary scandal broke out in March 2006 and truly exploded in late 2006 early 
2007. According to Harvey Kline’s Showing Teeth to the Dragons, the paramilitary-political 
connections were discovered  
when the technical corps of investigation of the national prosecutor’s office 
arrested Edgar Ignacio Fierro Florez (“Don Antonio”), a lieutenant of Rodrigo 
Tovar Pupo (“Jorge 40”). Fierro Florez had in his possession… two computers, 
two flash drives, and many compact discs and handwritten documents. Lists of 
collaborators and activities in the Caribbean coastal area were among the files 
found on the computer, as well as the description of 558 assassinations. The file 
that shook Colombian democracy… was one that contained the names of 
politicians and merchants in the Caribbean coastal departments with alleged 
strong ties to Jorge 40’s paramilitary group.2 
 
Following the discovery of these documents came many studies in order to fully uncover the 
extent of the parapolitical networks. By 2008, almost 40 percent of Congress members had been 
implicated3 and the national prosecutor’s office had cases against “155 regional political leaders, 
                                                
2 Kline, H. F. (2009). Showing teeth to the dragons: state-building by Colombian president  
Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 2002-2006. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. p188. 
3  Hristov, J., 2009. Legalizing the illegal: paramilitarism in Colombia’s ‘post-paramilitary’ era. 
NACLA Report on the Americas. p15. Retrieved November 2015 from 
http://www.jasminhristov.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2010/publications/NACLA_FINAL_VERSION.pdf 
	   Canas	  Baena	  5	  
76 members of the armed forces, 14 members of the judicial branch, and 12 governors”.4 In line 
with these statistics was Salvatore Mancuso’s statement that about 35 percent of Congress was 
controlled by the AUC.5 Furthermore, some of Alvaro Uribe’s closest political allies were 
amongst those under investigation. These include former Minister of Defense (and current 
Colombian President) Juan Manuel Santos, Vice President Francisco Santos Calderón, Senator 
Mario Uribe, Santiago Uribe Veléz (Alvaro Uribe’s brother), former presidential adviser Obdulio 
Gaviria, amid others. Even though Mario Uribe was the only person convicted from this list, a 
trend referred to as parauribismo exemplifies that “85 percent of those implicated in the 
parapolitics scandal are from parties that support the president.”6 The fact that such a high 
percentage of individuals involved in the parapolitical nexus supported Uribe’s government 
showcases the deep and ingrained nature of the parapolitical networks in Colombia. It also 
demonstrates the paramilitary’s influence at even the highest levels of government.  
Moreover, the extent of the paramilitary-political relations had a negative effect on 
Uribe’s credibility. This occurred because the organization, Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, 
released a study demonstrating that paramilitary groups had influenced the 2002 and 2006 
presidential elections.7 Alongside these accusations of electoral fraud, former top Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary commanders such as Don Berma and Salvatore 
                                                
4 Kline, H. F. (2009). Showing teeth to the dragons: state-building by Colombian president 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 2002-2006. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. p198. 
5 Salvatore Mancuso vincula a más políticos con las autodefensas. (2007, May 16). Semana, p.3. 
http://www.semana.com/on-line/articulo/salvatore-mancuso-vincula-mas-
politicosautodefensas/85941-3  
6 Hristov, J., 2009. Legalizing the illegal: paramilitarism in Colombia’s ‘post-paramilitary’ era. 
NACLA Report on the Americas. p16. Retrieved November 2015 from 
http://www.jasminhristov.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2010/publications/NACLA_FINAL_VERSION.pdf 
7 Kline, H. F. (2009). Showing teeth to the dragons: state-building by Colombian president  
Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 2002-2006. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. p190. 
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Mancuso also declared that their organization funded Uribe’s 2002 and 2006 campaigns.8 While 
Uribe’s government tried to discredit and deny both of those claims he never offered evidence to 
disprove the accusations. Instead, he argued that they were simply malicious attacks from the 
media, and dismissed the allegations. 
The state’s strong, interwoven ties to paramilitary organizations renders transparency and 
accountability in Colombia’s democratic process non-existent. Having a paramilitary infused 
state renders the Colombian government partial to the interests of criminal organizations and 
makes it an accomplice to the human rights violations that paramilitaries have committed. 
Moreover, it implies that there is a strong network of politicians that, in order to maintain power 
and status, are willing to cooperate with and cover for their accomplices if/when criminal 
investigations ensue. In so being, Uribe’s government benefitted from this symbiotic relationship 
until the scandal erupted.  
The DAS scandal further serves to illustrate Uribe’s government ties to the paramilitaries. 
The DAS was the state’s intelligence agency and reported directly to Uribe, it was dismantled 
when Juan Manuel Santos became president. Its mission was to carry out “strategic intelligence, 
criminal investigations, immigration controls, and protection of high officials in order to 
contribute actively to guarantee internal and external security of the state, to preserve the 
integrity of the constitution, and to defend national interests.”9 In 2008, it became public that the 
DAS had strong ties to the paramilitaries and was illegally wiretapping political opponents of 
Uribe’s government.  
                                                
8 Colombia drug lord “funded Uribe.” (2009, April 23). BBC News. Retrieved October 2015 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8015555.stm 
9 Kline, H. F. (2009). Showing teeth to the dragons: state-building by Colombian president 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 2002-2006. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. p190. 
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Since the scandal broke out, many DAS officials have been tried and condemned. Among 
these are top DAS officials such as the former Director, Jorge Noguera. Noguera had been 
Uribe’s presidential campaign manager in 2002 and then became director of DAS in August of 
2002.10  He was forced to resign in October 2005 because he was “under threat of prosecution for 
alleged cooperation with several powerful Colombian paramilitary bosses”.11 Subsequently, he 
was appointed to serve as Colombians consul in Milan, Italy until mid-2006 when Rafael García 
accused him of collaborating with paramilitaries. García was the former head of information 
technology for DAS, and was “convicted of erasing or otherwise altering official records” after 
the scandal broke out.12 One of the major allegations that García made against Noguera is that 
during his time as Director, DAS practiced violence against Trade Unions, including death. For 
example, Garcia claimed that Noguera ordered the creation of “a list of trade unionists and others 
to be targeted by paramilitaries in the northern coast”, including Professor Alfredo Correa de 
Andreis. Correa was killed in 2004 by the previously mentioned AUC commander Edgar Ignacio 
Fierro Florez’s Northern Bloc.13 According to the Colombian Prosecutor General’s office, 
                                                
10 Human Rights Watch. (2008, October 16). Breaking the Grip? Obstacles to Justice for 
Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia. Retrieved November 16, 2015, from 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/10/16/breaking-grip/obstacles-justice-paramilitary-mafias-
colombia 
11Aiello, K. (n.d.). Spying Scandal Highlights the Use of Colombia’s Women as Weapons of 
War. Retrieved November 2015, from https://nacla.org/news/spying-scandal-highlights-use-
colombias-women-weapons-war   
12 Human Rights Watch. (2008, October 16). Breaking the Grip? Obstacles to Justice for 
Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia. Retrieved November 16, 2015, from 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/10/16/breaking-grip/obstacles-justice-paramilitary-mafias-
colombia 
13 ibid  
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García’s allegations hold true.14 This exemplifies how Uribe’s government collaborated with the 
paramilitaries and thus acted in illegal ways in order to rid itself of its political opponents.  
In addition, in collaborating with the paramilitaries, Uribe operated a parallel state. The 
Head of the DAS, Maria del Pilar Hurtado illegally wiretapped political opponents of President 
Uribe’s government. Victims of the illegal wiretappings included “Magistrates of the Supreme 
Court, opponent leaders in Colombia and Human Rights Defenders” as well as journalists. 15 
When the DAS wiretapping controversy broke out, Pilar Hurtado stepped down, and like 
Noguera, tried to avoid being implicated by going abroad. Hurtado sought political asylum in 
Panama until it was revoked four years later.16 While she was in Panama, the former General 
Secretary at the Colombian President’s Office, Bernardo Moreno, as well as many other high 
level former intelligence and counterintelligence officials were condemned for the illegal 
wiretappings and then testified against her.17 The extensive indictment of top level DAS 
employees demonstrates that Uribe’s government sought to acquire information that would lead 
to furthering the goals of his democratic security platform through violating human rights. In so 
being, these tactics act as illegal mechanisms that serve to further compromise Colombia’s 
democracy and allow him to silence opponents, but not to have a monopoly on power.  
                                                
14General Attorney of Colombia Office. (2014). General Attorney Office investigates the loss of 
files regarding the case of DAS wiretappings on Claudia Julieta Duque. Fiscalía General de la 
Nación. Retrieved November 11, 2015, from http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/en/noticias/general-
attorney-office-investigates-the-loss-of-files-regarding-the-case-of-das-wiretappings-on-claudia-
julieta-duque/  
15 General Attorney of Colombia Office. (2015). The arrest of former DAS director was declared 
as legal. (2015, January 31). Retrieved November 11, 2015, from 
http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/en/noticias/destacada/the-arrest-of-former-das-director-was-declared-
as-legal/ 
16 ¿Llegó a su fin el caso de las chuzadas? (2015, May 2). Retrieved November 15, 2015, from  
http://www.semana.com//nacion/articulo/llego-su-fin-el-caso-de-las-chuzadas-del-das/426126-3 
17 ibid 
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Uribe’s public response to the charges against those he worked closely with has been 
minimal. He hides behind his statements of war on cartels and the FARC, refuses to answer to 
journalist questions, denies all allegations of involvement in DAS’s ties to paramilitaries and its 
illegal activities. His actual response to the evident corruption of his employees and close 
political allies has been mostly through his twitter account, which seems to be his first line of 
defense. Communicating through twitter is very strategic given that only his side of the 
conversation is read, and questions do not have to be responded. For example, in 2013, when a 
preliminary criminal investigation against Uribe was reopened by Colombia’s Attorney 
General’s Office, Uribe and his lawyers are reported to have denied all charges. On his Twitter 
feed he stated that “the allegations were ‘criminal vengeance’ by imprisoned drug-dealing 
paramilitaries.”18 This statement demonstrates that Uribe not only denies the allegations, but that 
he completely dismisses them. By refusing to address this he attempts to delegitimize their 
claims.  Now in 2015, two years since he was cleared by the Attorney General’s Office, Uribe 
continues with his Twitter tactic instead of making official declarations to the media. After 
Noguera and Hurtado were unanimously convicted by the Supreme Court of Justice, Uribe 
tweeted “El Martes, en versión ante CorteSJ me pronunciare sobre el dolor que me embarga” to 
express his pain over his former intelligence agency directors being condemned.19 Through this, 
Uribe once more avoids being questioned about his former colleagues, and situates himself in a 
position that separates his government and individual’s within his government’s actions. 
                                                
18 "Colombia's Alvaro Uribe Investigated for 'militia Links'" BBC News. BBC News, 9 Jan. 
2013. Web. Retrieved 16 Apr. 2015 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-
20956820   
19 "Expresidente Uribe, Dolido Por Condena De Hurtado Y Moreno." El Heraldo, 28 Feb. 2015. 
p1. Web. Retrieved 15 Apr. 2015 from http://www.elheraldo.co/nacional/expresidente-uribe-
dolido-por-condena-de-hurtado-y-moreno-185868 
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Nonetheless, because these individuals clearly reported to him, as was the role of the directors of 
DAS, whether his involvement in the controversy is proven or not, his government benefitted 
from collaborating with paramilitaries in order to advance his agenda and from illegally 
wiretapping political opponents because he could anticipate their political moves.  
As the DAS scandal continued to develop, the false positives scandal erupted in Bogotá 
in 2008 during Uribe’s second term. False-positives refers to extra-judicial killings wherein 
Colombian military members killed civilians living in poor working class and remote areas, 
dressed them up as FARC guerrilla members and laid weapons on them, and then reported them 
as enemy combatants. Victims tended to belonged to marginalized groups, such as unemployed 
persons, drug addicts, social and community leaders, indigenous persons, minors, peasants, and 
persons with disabilities.20 According to a 2015 report released by Human Rights Watch, the 
scandal broke out in September 2008 when “a media scandal over army troops’ killings of young 
men and teenage boys from the Bogotá suburb of Soacha helped force the government to take 
serious measures to stop the crimes, including by dismissing three army generals”.21 It was the 
media scandal and international pressure that led to governmental response to the crimes that the 
Colombian military had engaged in since the 1990s, but truly blew up in 2004 through 2008 
when Uribe was in office.22 Since 2008, the Colombian attorney general’s office has investigated 
and determined that “to date, members of at least 41 brigades and mobile brigades have been 
                                                
20 International Criminal Court. (2012). Situation in Colombia Interim Report. p28. Retrieved 9 
November 2015 from https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3D3055BD-16E2-4C83-BA85-
35BCFD2A7922/285102/OTPCOLOMBIAPublicInterimReportNovember2012.pdf 
21 Human Rights Watch. (2015, June 24). On Their Watch. p1. Retrieved November 2015, from 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/24/their-watch/evidence-senior-army-officers-
responsibility-false-positive-killings 
22 International Criminal Court. (2012). Situation in Colombia Interim Report. p3. Retrieved 9 
November 2015 from https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3D3055BD-16E2-4C83-BA85-
35BCFD2A7922/285102/OTPCOLOMBIAPublicInterimReportNovember2012.pdf 
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implicated…. [that accounts for] almost all the army brigades in Colombia”.23 Moreover, Human 
Rights Watch states that “more than 3,000 alleged false positives by military personnel” are 
currently under investigation.24 While those convicted have mostly been low-ranking soldiers, 
there is strong evidence that suggests that high-ranking officers also share responsibility in the 
extra-judicial killings of non-combatants. 
Furthermore, in analyzing the Prosecutor General’s records, Human Rights Watch has 
determined that these killings were systematic modes of operation within the armed forces of 
Colombia. These false positives “entailed significant planning and coordination, ranging from 
bringing victims to remote locations, to ensuring each case had official documentation 
purporting it was a lawful combat death.”25 Moreover, evidence suggests that the motivation 
behind these widespread killings was the fact that during Uribe’s government there was pressure 
for the military to show “results in the fight against guerrillas and crime”.26 There was also a new 
system put in place which measured the military’s success against the guerrilla in terms of the 
number of combat kills. In order to incentivize soldiers, the government established a reward and 
punishment strategy. Soldiers were rewarded them with “vacation time, promotions, medals, 
training courses, and congratulations from their superiors, among other prizes”27; and punished 
with army removal for not meeting certain combat kill quotas.  
Although most convictions have been of low ranking soldiers, the top level commanders 
of the Colombian military as well as the former president share a direct responsibility for these 
                                                
23 Human Rights Watch. (2015, June 24). On Their Watch. p8. Retrieved November 2015, from 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/24/their-watch/evidence-senior-army-officers-
responsibility-false-positive-killings 
24 Ibid 1 
25 Ibid 6 
26 Ibid 26 
27 Ibid 29 
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killings. The policies Uribe implemented during his time in office worked to further encourage 
this unlawful and institutionalized system of killing typically marginalized civilians, because 
although false positives did not have their start during his period in office, their frequency did 
increase drastically. Moreover, the absence of military accountability demonstrated throughout 
this scandal shows how the state acted undemocratically in order to make it seem as if it were 
indeed achieving the goals of peace and security that the president had set for the country when 
he came into office. In so being, Colombia’s legal process and criminal system was 
compromised and shadows a repressive government. 
In addition to this, these extra-judicial killings buttressed Uribe’s government because, 
prior to the scandal, they served to illustrate the successful nature of his government to address 
the issues on the agenda. The inflated statistics of killed guerrilla members demonstrated that his 
hardliner stance against the armed rebel groups was going to bring Colombia the peace and 
security that citizens demanded. Thus, despite the evidence human rights organizations brought 
forth, Uribe tried to dismiss the false positives scandal. He initially stated that “the scandal was 
being used to discredit and hinder the security forces in their fight against terrorists,” but after 
witnessing the public’s negative reaction, he “pushed for hard punishments in the few most well-
known cases.”28 This showcases his government’s concerns were not to find a solution for the 
systematic production of violence the armed forces of Colombia were inflicting on civilians 
living in remote populations. Instead, his government focused on downplaying the false positives 
scandal in order to protect and maintain its image as successful because it was winning back 
rebel territory. His focus on maintaining popular support, while not addressing the issue of those 
                                                
28 Rojas Mejia, P. (2010, January 15). Progress on the false positives cases: a case of false hope? 
Colombia Reports. Retrieved November 2015 from http://colombiareports.com/progress-on-the-
false-positives-cases-just-a-case-of-false-hope/ 
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suffering from increased violence at the hands of the military, completely contradicts the 
environment of public security that Colombians wanted him to provide.  
Uribe’s campaign promise to provide public safety for Colombian citizens was 
implemented through the Democratic Security and Defense Policy initiative of 2003. This 
policy’s objectives, according to Uribe’s official website, are to restore peace, respect the 
constitution and the laws, respect human rights, restore faith in the Armed Forces, create 
opportunities for economic progress, and finally, to do this all with transparency. This would be 
achieved through offensive components such as coordinating and unifying military, police, and 
government intelligence; strengthening the state’s armed forces, the police, the intelligence, and 
its finances; and consolidating control of national territory by restoring the state presence in 
critical areas through the use of the military and local police.29 It would also be accomplished 
through defensive components such as protecting the population and enhancing the respect for 
human rights; protecting the economic infrastructure by securing the infrastructure of 
transportation, energy, and communications; and strengthening the governments deterrent 
capacity.30 These measures were greatly accomplished through an increase in military and police 
spending and expanding government bureaucracy to create greater control over these armed state 
forces. As a result of the state’s implementation of these security measures, Uribe’s regime 
argued that peace and financial stability would become a possibility in Colombia. However, the 
false positives are a direct result of the increase in military and intelligence unification and 
spending. The scandal contradicts the environment of public security for all Colombian citizens 
                                                
29 MARKS, T. A. (2006). Colombian Military Support for “Democratic Security.” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 17(2), 204-205 
30 Ibid 206 
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that Uribe promised. Because of this, the democratic value to secure and protect the human rights 
of all citizens was violated.   
Moreover, Uribe’s 2002 campaign was also founded on the premise that through his 
Democratic Security Policy, Colombia would also grow economically. Uribe argued that 
Colombia would recover from the 1999 recession from which the country was still suffering.31 
According to Salomón Kalmanovitz’s Recesiòn y recuperación de la economía Colombiana,  
Las acciones en el campo de la seguridad dieron lugar a una mejora 
sustancial de las expectativas de empresarios y consumidores. Los éxitos 
militares del Gobierno y el repliegue táctico de la guerrilla despertaron a 
los empresarios, que aumentaron la inversión, al tiempo que mejoraban 
también las expectativas de los consumidores.32  
 
Thus, because the false positives served to augment statistics that illustrated the government was 
taking back territory from the rebels and public security was on the rise, these extrajudicial and 
true-killings also served to attract investment. Direct foreign investment data (figure 1) during 
the Uribe years further demonstrate the economic growth during Uribe’s time in office. Through 
it, it is clear that the economy grew from 2003-2008, then began to decline when the false 
positives scandal erupted and the global economic recession struck. Thus, the false positives 
served as a mechanism through which Uribe’s administration gained popular support because the 
enhanced public security statistics served to attract investment.  
                                                
31 Posada-Carbó, E. (2006). Colombia Hews to the Path of Change. Journal of Democracy, 17(4), 
p.84 
32 Kalmanovitz, Salomón. (2004). Recesiòn y recuperación de la economía Colombiana. Nueva 
Sociedad: Democracia y Política en América Latina, 192 p. 102 
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 As the parapolitics, DAS, and false positive scandals illustrates, public security did not 
improve as much as Uribe’s government argues. While some security indicators, such as 
kidnappings (figure 2)33, and intentional homicide counts (figure 3)34 decreased, other indicators 
                                                
33 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Statistics. (2015). Colombia Crime and Criminal 
Justice Statistics, Kidnappings at National Level [Data file]. Retrieved November 2015 from 
https://data.unodc.org/sys/rpt?reportfile=crime-statistics-
kidnapping&REGION=Americas&REGION__label=Americas&SUBREGION=South%20Amer
ica&SUBREGION__label=South+America&COUNTRY=40&COUNTRY__label=Colombia&f
ormat=html&fullscreen=true&showtoc=true#state:0 
34 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Statistics. (2015). Colombia Crime and Criminal 
Justice Statistics, Intentional Homicides [Data file]. Retrieved November 2015 from 
https://data.unodc.org/sys/rpt?reportfile=crime-statistics-homicide-count-
data&REGION=Americas&REGION__label=Americas&SUBREGION=South%20America&S
Figure 1 Direct	  Foreign	  Investment	  in	  Millions	  of	  Dollars	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such as assault (figure 4)35 and theft (figure 5)36 increased. Moreover, the number of internally 
displaced persons also rose during the first Uribe administration. These statistics seem to 
demonstrate that organized crime definitely decreased during his first term and that many 
benefitted from this occurrence, which may be attributed to the cease-fire and demobilization of 
the AUC paramilitary during Uribe’s first four years. Nevertheless, Amnesty International’s 
2007 Report expresses that in spite of the paramilitary-government negotiations, “some 
demobilized paramilitaries had failed to demobilize, and that new paramilitary groups had 
emerged.”37 This serves to illustrate that the demobilization strategy was not as successful as the 
government claimed because they were demobilized only to be replaced by another.  
 
                                                
UBREGION__label=South+America&COUNTRY=40&COUNTRY__label=Colombia&format
=html&fullscreen=true&showtoc=true#state:0 
35 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Statistics. (2015). Colombia Crime and Criminal 
Justice Statistics, Assaults at National Level [Data file]. Retrieved November 2015 from 
https://data.unodc.org/sys/rpt?reportfile=crime-statistics-
assaults&REGION=Americas&REGION__label=Americas&SUBREGION=South%20America
&SUBREGION__label=South+America&COUNTRY=40&COUNTRY__label=Colombia&for
mat=html&fullscreen=true&showtoc=true#state:0 
36 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Statistics. (2015). Colombia Crime and Criminal 
Justice Statistics, Theft at National Level [Data file]. Retrieved November 2015 from 
https://data.unodc.org/sys/rpt?reportfile=crime-statistics-persons-
theft&REGION=Americas&REGION__label=Americas&SUBREGION=South%20America&S
UBREGION__label=South+America&COUNTRY=40&COUNTRY__label=Colombia&format
=html&fullscreen=true&showtoc=true#state:0 
37 Amnesty International. (2008). Amnesty International Report 2007 (Amnesty International 
Annual World Report). p88 
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The increase in petty crime during the Uribe administration demonstrates that while a 
significant part of the population was benefitting from the governments economic and security 
policies, Colombia’s lower socio-economic class sections were not benefitting as much. 38 
Similar to the increases in petty crime, the increase in internally displaced members of the 
population, as demonstrated in figure 6, exemplifies the short comings of the government’s 
Democratic Security policies.39 The increase in violence towards the typically marginalized 
members of the population further illustrates that it is mostly the middle and upper classes that 
benefitted from the new policies that the government had enacted. In fact, in a case study of one 
of Cali’s poorest cities, Aguablanca, Eduardo Moncada argues that those living in lower stratas 
“generally experience unequal access to basic social services and remain mired in the low-
income service and informal sectors of the economy.”40 Uribe’s policies did little to mitigate the 
social class divide.  
Because of the rise in displaced persons, Uribe’s strategy of militarized fighting in rural 
areas is contradictory to the “climate of security” he was trying to achieve throughout Colombia. 
According to Amnesty International, the civilian communities that are most at risk due to these 
policies are the “Afro-descendant, Indigenous, and peasant farmer communities, as well as 
                                                
38 Colombia has a stratification system that classifies “urban populations into different strata with 
similar economic characteristics” and serves to divide the cities “into zones of wealth and 
poverty”.  
Esbjørn, A., & Pérez Fjalland, E. (2012, November 22). COLOMBIA - SOCIAL 
STRATIFICATION BY LAW. International Federation for Housing and Planning. Retrieved 
November 2015 from http://www.ifhp.org/ifhp-blog/colombia-social-stratification-law 
39 World Development Indicators. (2015) Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Retrieved 
November 2015 from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-
development-indicators  
40 Moncada, Eduardo. (2011). Counting Bodies: Crime Mapping, Policing, and Race in 
Colombia. New racial missions of policing: International perspectives on evolving law-
enforcement politics (Ethnic and Racial Studies; Ethnic and Racial Studies). London: 
Routledge/Taylor & Francis. p 125 
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civilians living in areas of intense military conflict.”41 In other words, under-resourced 
communities were suffering from an increase in violent conflict. In so being, although indicators 
of violence demonstrate a decreasing trend during Uribe’s first term in office there was an 
unbalanced relationship among the different social classes and exemplify the deeply embedded 
socio-economic class divisions that exist in Colombia. 
 
Nonetheless, Uribe’s approval ratings are extremely high in comparison to other 
countries in Latin America. According to the Latin American Public Opinion Project, during his 
first two years in office, Uribe could boast of a 70.3 percent evaluation of performance rating as  
                                                
41 Amnesty International. (2008). Amnesty International Report 2007 (Amnesty International 
Annual World Report). p 90 
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can be seen in figure 7.42 It was overwhelmingly the highest approval rating even among other 
Latin American countries. Moreover, although his policies led to an increase in violence towards 
already marginalized populations, at the moment of re-election, Uribe was overwhelmingly the 
leading candidate and received 62 percent of the vote.43 This illustrates that 9 percent more of the 
those who voted, compared to the 2002 election, were in favor of having him as president, as can 
be seen in figure 8. Even in 2008, after the three scandals had already been exposed, his approval 
rating remained the highest in Latin America with 69.3 percent of the population approving of 
his presidency’s work (figure 9). 44 This further demonstrates the satisfaction of citizens and the 
support of the policies implemented during the first four years that resulted in overall increased 
economic and social stability for Colombians – in spite of the increased violence and instability 
that resulted for historically marginalized communities.  
                                                
42 Latin American Public Opinion Project (2004) [Graph illustration Uribe’s Performance 
Evaluation in Comparison to other Latin American Countries’ Leaders] Cultura política de la 
democracia en Colombia, 2004. p 204 Retrieved October 2015 from 
www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/2004-politicalculture.pdf 
43 Carr, A. (n.d.). Presidential Election of 28 May 2006. Retrieved October 2015 from 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/c/colombia/colombia2006pres.txt 
44 Latin American Public Opinion Project (2008) [Graph illustration Approval of President’s 
Work in Comparison to other Latin American Countries’ Leaders] Cultura política de la 
democracia en Colombia, 2008 El impacto de la gobernabilidad. p 276. Retrieved December 
2015 http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2008/colombia-es.pdf 
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Figure 7 Uribe’s Performance Evaluation in Comparison to other Latin American Countries’ Leaders 
 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project (2004) [Graph illustration Uribe’s Performance Evaluation in 
Comparison to other Latin American Countries’ Leaders] Cultura política de la democracia en Colombia, 2004.  
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 Employing undemocratic mechanisms, Uribe and his government pretended to deliver 
democratic stability that citizens desired, towards the end of his presidency, in 2009, Uribe 
remained quite popular.45 The Latin American Public Opinion Project conducted a series of polls 
to determine how much confidence citizens had in the national government, the president, and in 
the national armed forces. The polls measured the response on a scale from one to seven, one 
                                                
45 The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Retrieved 
October 2015 from www.LapopSurveys.org.  
Figure 9 Approval of President’s Work in Comparison to other Latin American Countries’ 
Leaders 
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being no confidence and seven being a lot of confidence. The results, provided below in figure 
10, demonstrate that the majority of citizens surveyed definitely maintained confidence in 
Uribe’s government despite the scandals. This, according to the 2010 Report that Latin American 
Public Opinion Project produced, is strongly attributed to the fact that Colombian citizens 
generally tend to support the government when the economy is growing or is in a period of 
stability.46  
The 2007-2009 economic recession did not seem to have an effect on Colombian’s 
support of Uribe’s government in spite of the unfolding of the par politics, DAS, and false 
positives scandals. One possibility for this may be that the majority of Colombians who have a 
voice in politics are not personally affected by the polemics of Uribe’s government. In fact, they 
                                                
46 Rodríguez-Raga, J. C., & Seligson, M. (2011). Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 
2010 Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times. Latin America Public Opinion 
Project. p66. Retrieved October 2015 from http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/2010-
political-culture-English.pdf 
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were still benefitting from the increase in public security that Uribe’s government had been able 
to provide. In so being, although Uribe’s government was heavily involved with paramilitaries 
(which although officially demobilized, still exists); was spying on its citizens; and committed 
human rights abuses in order to demonstrate positive results from the Democratic Security 
policies that were implemented, the overwhelming support from the majority of citizens may 
indicate that they believe his government’s measures were necessary in order to bring an end to 
the decades old civil war and finally gain the peace the country desires. Thus, Uribe’s 
administration was able to maintain popularity despite the fact that it relied on or created a 
clandestine parallel government because it framed the government’s actions around the fight 
against cartels and guerrilla members, on the decrease in homicide and kidnapping rates, and the 
general improvement of the economy since he stepped into office. It also benefitted from the 
polarized social classes and was able to manipulate the public’s desire for peace in a decades old 
civil war. 
Uribe’s basis of democratic support made him one of Latin America’s most popular 
presidents, yet he did this through extra-legal and non-democratic tactics. His policy of 
democratic stability through increased intelligence and military spending led to many human 
rights violations, as has the collaborative relationship between paramilitaries and top-level 
government officials. In so being, the scandals serve to shed light on the polemics of Uribe’s 
government and it points to the fragility of democracy where class divisions are so deeply 
embedded. Moreover, it suggests that Colombia’s democracy and democratic process has been 
compromised.  
To conclude, Alvaro Uribe’s government was riddled with serious high profile scandals, 
such as the parapolitics, DAS, and false positives scandals. The parapolitics scandal revealed a 
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vast paramilitary-political network. Almost 40 percent of congress, many regional politicians, 
members of the armed forces, and members of the judicial branch were implicated. It also 
brought into question Uribe’s presidential 2002 and 2006 campaign funds and the legitimacy of 
the elections. The DAS scandal further exemplifies the Uribe administration’s para-political 
network. Many of the former intelligence agency’s high ranking officials have been condemned 
for collaborating with the paramilitaries as well as for illegally wiretapping political opponents. 
Through these actions they violated human rights. As the parapolitics and DAS scandals 
continued to be investigated, the false positive scandal erupted. This scandal exposed the 
systematic extrajudicial killings the Colombian military of many lower socio-economic class 
citizens. Thus, it demonstrates the deep social class divide within Colombian citizens. The fact 
that these killings served as mechanisms through which Uribe’s administration could partly 
prove its successful democratic security policies prior to the scandal illustrates the Colombian 
government was acting as a parallel state.  
Nonetheless, despite the scandals and the increase in violence towards vulnerable 
communities as typified in the increase in assault, theft, and displacement rates, Uribe and his 
government remained amongst the most popular in Latin America. His approval rating before the 
scandals was 70.9 percent and in 2008 after the scandals had all been exposed it was 69.3 
percent. His popularity may be explained as a result of the majority of citizens, excluding the 
those living in historically marginalized communities, benefitted from his policies. Moreover, 
Uribe did not address critics of his government or the media, instead he created a discourse that 
his government and its policies were responsible for successfully combatting the guerrillas and 
the cartels, decreasing homicide and kidnapping rates, and improving the economy. Thus 
Colombians may have chosen to support him because they saw his clandestine government 
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tactics as a necessary mechanism through which to end the civil war and gain economic growth 
and stability.  
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